We seek the TRUTH!

As you know in recent weeks the upcoming battle has become public.

The CEO has been lambasting 'a small group' of controllers as the reasons for all his ills.

He has called them (or at least the sub editors have) various words including, militants, renegades and shirkers.  

In what now is a very public battle, apparently all the TIBA lies at the hand of a small group of employees who originally were refusing to work overtime, but now are also 'spiking' their sick leave.  In other words, taking fraudulent sick leave to cause maximum damage.

But what is the truth?  How much sick leave is actually covered by overtime?  How much overtime is used to cover "HOLES IN ROSTERS"?  Is sick leave on the rise at all? If it is rising, is there a link between working harder when at work and having less days off a month?

We have evidence that some groups have as many as 30 shifts each month, and that is at the roster 'population' stage, that need coverage with overtime.  THAT IS BEFORE ANYONE HAS CALLED IN SICK.

So in that particular group, of the 15 employees they each have to work 2 shifts of overtime each, before anyone calls in sick to cover the core roster.  Not bad for a roster that gives most people 10 days off a month.  The average sick leave across the ATC workforce is unknown.  Recently it was about 12 days a year; much more recently it's been 4 times the national average (36), or three times (27), or three times the national benchmark of 6 (18).  But let guess it's close to 12; or one day a month.  So talking of that particular group, 15 shifts will also need to be covered because of sick leave.  A total of 45 shifts or 3 shifts each.

The expectation is that the overtime will be shared equally.  This is far from reality as we all know that we have different work/life balances.  We can also surmise that as a result of our rostering processes that most of the shifts (at least 30) of them are in the middle of the night; which are the most difficult to cover; who want's to work a night shift in the middle of two days off; it effectively counts against both days off, so you end up with 20 odd hours between shifts, but NO DAYS OFF AT ALL.

So how did it get this bad?

We here at Certified Shafting have concluded that it's not the fault of renegades and militants.  It's totally at the hands of management.

In particular the CEO Greg Russell, who's sycophants implemented the SDE without any consequential thought about whether the idea was good or not.

Long term we can see benefit in the SDE, in terms of keeping jets away from lighties, and changes to airspace classifications in the future in terms of training resources.  But what was the rush?

We have burnt countless good will and inherent efficiencies that the previous structure had built in through years of amendment.  Prior to SDE in late 2007, the sector structure has been effectively unchanged since 1995; with the exception of minor amendments associated with transitioning to TAAATS.  These sectors and rosters had been subjected to significant reforms in that time in terms of roster lines required and (mostly) efficient procedures, refined over that time.

SDE was effectively a clean slate (yeah right).  It was predicated on the myth that standardisation exists, which it doesn't.  It is a flawed concept in that CITY PAIRS were used to determine the airspace design and structures; with pertinent exceptions from the model; leading to significant inefficiency and complications.

SDE split rosters.

SDE split people who had multiple ratings into small groups with isolated roles.

The above group, went from 19 Staff requiring 6 people on any given shift, to 15 on one side needing 5 on a given day and 12 requiring 4 on a given day.  One group of 19 people that used to run efficiently now need 27 staff.  This was done in the name of efficiency. WTF?

It was pointed out by middle management that we shouldn't proceed with SDE on the original time lines. This was rejected by senior management as 'politically unacceptable".

These new groups now required night shift coverage; this group used to have 2 night shift staff; now it has 4.  Is there any wonder that night shift coverage has become an issue?

The extra 8 people didn't suddenly appear.  Most of the holes in rosters were covered by overtime; initially it was accepted with grace; but it was soon clear that the staffing problems were going to exist for a significant period of time, people got sick (quickly) of being called every single day off to come to work, our informant tells us that it was not uncommon to get multiple calls every day.

Then when you were at work, it was likely that you didn't have a full complement of staff on most days; single person duty was (and is) relatively common.  So minimum staffing was three but only one controller was on duty; funnily enough this had a propensity to increase your unavailability to work on subsequent shifts; because you were going home far too knackered.  If you were called on your day off; it was likely that you'd be subjecting yourself to short staffing rostering again too, thus it was not a 'normal shift' you were replacing but a "super shift"; and one you were less likely to accept.

This was not isolated to one group, but every group initially up the ECS line; now we head towards further implementation with RS and UAS groups also making amendments into the SDE environment.

It is not surprising at all to us that SDE has been a significant failure.  It was rushed, it was not resourced properly, it was warped into something unrecognisable from the original intent.  

All resistance to SDE was treated as an industrial issue and objectors were dismissed as 'wankers' who didn't get it.  We are past the point of no return, but how can we get out of this bucket of shit?  And will the solution be for the CEO to blame controllers for not coming to work?

Well now 10 months into SDE, where rosters are still short, we ask was it a good idea?

GREG, was it?  Please respond, we'll leave your comment here unmoderated.

CEO Interview - part 1

Thanks for all the feedback and due to popular demand we will tackle this one now, even though we think it speaks for itself, he doesn't get it.

Well let's summarise the interview:

Greg Russell on ATC reform: “...and frankly there has been some terrific work done.”

Oh come on, you’re smoking something!

Greg Russell on The New Management:   “I do think there is some further work to do in terms of up-skilling some of our managers in that area and getting them to focus on their new accountabilities”

No shit Sherlock; what are the chances of getting them away from the supervisor consoles to up-skill them? To busy chasing their tails?  Maybe the cutting of the numbers half way through wasn't the best move, then again taking more operational staff away from consoles would have crippled the business, no wait, too late.

Greg Russell on the first 18 months: “...making the place more efficient – some of that was cost reduction; there were areas where we were clearly wasting money. But it is not all about cost reduction and I think now the dial has moved.”

It was all about cost cutting, the dial has moved because you can’t maintain your minimum requirements; you’ve got your fingers in the cookie jar.  You clearly cut too far, there were no business cases or justification for doing most of what you did.  You ruled by fear, those who objected got the chop.  Those who didn’t object, believed your rhetoric, now almost to the letter, they don’t.

Greg Russell on the next (the last)18 months: “Having built some good systems, rationalised parts of the organisation and reduced our costs, we turned to fixing issues that had plagued this business for a long time – proper recruitment, proper training of our people and the whole issue of workforce planning and development of our people.”

We repeat, you’re smoking something!  Workforce planning has always been paramount particularly in ATC, the previous managers, George and Andrew had weekly discussions with managers about the numbers, they always argued too high, so did you. You banked on technology, then didn't support it's implementation, typical.

Greg Russell on the changes in the last 12 months: “Undoubtedly our focus on workforce planning.”

Only because of all the TIBAs; you were told (or at least your Level 2’s were told) not to proceed with some or all of SDE but you went ahead anyway.  How are the age profiles looking now?  How are we going to staff new towers?  Avalon, Williamtown on weekends and after RAAF hours, Karratha?   What's next? How are we going to build a 'bow-wave' for the new towers?

Greg Russell on staff planning: “We produced the first workforce plan in the early part of 2006 ... again in 2007 and we’ve just completed it again this year and the further we get into this the more I’ve come to an appreciation of just how critical is it ...”

The first plan in 2006?  BS mate, again in 2007, did it say numbers up or down?  What are the numbers like now, what's with 897?  We don't believe the numbers, if you did, you'd publish them far and wide for comment, SDL by SDL.

Greg Russell on staff shortages and the last 6 months: “the staff shortages based around some of the Melbourne sectors have settled a little, we are still having some difficulties though, particularly in the Sydney/Brisbane sectors. ...our numbers of operational ATCs are 21 below our required number of 897.”

What are the real numbers, we understand one SDL is nearly that short by itself, are you being loose with the truth Greg, what makes the 897, what's the breakdown?  SDL by SDL, project by project?

The majority of these shortages are a direct result of your SDE; in some cases you added 1/3rd extra controller jobs in the name of efficiency?  So how’s that working exactly?  Is there less or more holding into Sydney, into Brisbane or into Melbourne?  Obviously it’s more efficient.

Greg Russell on recruitment: “..we’ve got to recruit now for the future of the organisation and I think we referred to, back in January, the importance of building up enough of our employees particularly in the Air Traffic Control group and also in the fire service, so that we reduce this enormous dependency on institutionalised overtime.”

Institutionalised overtime, you’re not wrong, all those that work overtime in the current climate should be institutionalised.

Greg Russell on increasing staff: “...there has been a lot of pain in this process, there have been a lot of people who have I think put up with continuing levels of overtime but I made a commitment in January to fix this issue, and we have been doing that.”

You've realised you've got to open the purse strings and recruit people, it hurts.  Fixing it how exactly, recruiting abinitios? retaining people? recruiting more global recruits? recruiting more RAAF controllers?  You told us it would be fixed by June, hello, hello, what month is it?  Didn't say which June?

Greg Russell on the Training College: “There has been a significant amount of work for instance going on in the Airservices Learning Academy in Melbourne.  The appointment of a new team is almost complete and we are putting additional resources into bringing people back into the organisation, in some cases to deliver the training we need for accelerated and additional courses for Air Traffic Controllers.”

You’ve spent what nearly $50M on new simulators and technology, with not enough TGOs’ to drive it, with not enough instructors to make exercises, what with all the extra trainees in the system.  Accelerated courses, read shortened, removing basics from the college where economies of scale work, and putting the ‘core skills’ back to field training, yeah smart move, NOT!  

In the past 18 months, did we cut the shit out of the training resources and systems?  Didn't we reward managers for doing that, no wait they were making it more efficient.

Greg Russell on training results: “... I am confident more of our people are going to see more of these resources come out of our training facilities.”

GIGO, Garbage In Garbage Out!  Is it true some recruits are going to be employed to meet the numbers but be put in holding patterns awaiting a "real course start date", as opposed to the official one, field training before sim training, novel, a waste nope? 

Is it true you've lowered the skills bar to ensure we get the numbers in, despite not meeting the required minimum's in previous recruitment efforts?  Sounds like a great way to resolve the crisis, waste resources on training people who will never make it.  Maybe they can get to the field and bang a few together, that will help.

A Vision - Part 1

We applaud loudly the effort made by the representatives of the staff.  We boo loudly the lip service, attitude and general demeanour displayed by the employers representatives at the first meeting of the parties.

The first meeting, held approximately 3 weeks late, usually a scoping and planning meeting, reached no outcomes or even a timetable for progress.

One thing is clear to us at the Shafters, Airservices will scurry hide and be loose with the truth when it comes to negotiating in good faith.  No doubt we will be ‘surfaced’ as an example of why the union isn’t acting in good faith.  We'll say it again, we have no ties to the union, or any of the unions elected delegates.

We are few of number, but we are passionate in our beliefs. We believe that enterprise bargaining matters, that sharing profits is the best measure of and ultimately the beast means toward affordability of pay rises.

We firmly believe that there is no true mechanism for working out ATC productivity.  More traffic moved and less bodies doing it is one measure, safety outcomes another, costs vs revenue another, available work hours, amount of TIBA/TRA use; We're sure there are many others. 

All productivity measures are a balance or ratio of staff to traffic; too few staff will greatly effect the available work hours and safety outcomes and the amount or TIBA/TRA, too many staff will effect the traffic vs bodies argument and cost vs revenue.

But how do management decisions adversely effect productivity?  We have seen the most significant change to the ATC structure in the last 3 years since Sir Winston Churchill said “Never give in! Never give in! Never, never, never. Never -- in anything great or small, large or petty -- never give in except to convictions of honour and good sense”.   

All this under the tutelage of Greg Russell CEO.  This is the restructure “that we had to have”.  To position ourselves as a viable business in the future, to be able to adapt to new technology and to better organise the management to staff ratios and improve communication, remember we asked for it, to improve morale.  Don’t be fooled, a “bloody good pay rise” will do nothing for morale.

The repositioning was underpinned by the cornerstone called SDE.  It had an accompanying management structure comprising the ALM (AWA) process.  This has led to multiple redundancies at a time when we are ‘critically’ short staffed.  Management has argued that the redundancies were ‘unforeseeable’, despite alleged internal legal advice saying they would have to pay redundancies, despite the union and vocal employees stating that you will trigger redundancy pay-outs in this restructure.  

There is a case currently before AIRC, with a decision pending and imminent, where by more Air Traffic Controllers are seeking redundancy due to not being offered suitable redeployment caused by this management restructure again, all at a time when we are ‘critically short’.

We have now learned that in attempt to better control absenteeism which is ‘escalating’ that admin staff are now longer to take the calls of controllers calling in sick.  You will be redirected (or call directly when they move the phone) to the Operations Director, who presumably, will be able to tell if you are or aren’t genuinely sick, from that phone call, or perhaps you will just be too intimidated to call in sick if the Operations Director takes the call.

Then if you do manage to call in sick, you brave soldier you, you will be called by your ALM to ensure that there is nothing more that can be done to get you on your feet quicker; did someone say unreasonable intimidation?  Perhaps this strategy will have an adverse effect and make you feel worse or actually make you seek medical advice and take a few extra days than you otherwise would have had, on the direction of that medical advice.

Back to SDE, well a more rushed half arsed product you will never find.  Multiple resources absorbed into effectively duplicating roles and duties; cutting edges on maps, realigning sector boundaries with great aplomb, positioning ourselves to be better able to adapt to new technology.  When is this new technology going to be available?  Why rush into SDE?  Why waste resources right now; well it suited the political ideology at the time.

Were there warning signs that the pace was too fast, well you'd have to be blind Freddy not to have noticed.  Did this information get put to the Main War Room, of course it did, proceed plebs get on with it was the message from the Master don't bring us problems bring us solutions.

The cost, bad, bad, bad PR and a devastating effect on morale. 

99 out of 100 operational controllers in our quick survey, see no benefit in SDE right now, or in the next 2 years; only 17 saw a benefit of some description after 5 years (if all the technology works).  So why rush, because we could and we did.

SDE - Service Delivery Environments - Part 1

(picture with thanks to Dilbert)

We have seen a huge amount of re organisation within Airservices Australia over the last 3 years.  Our CEO commenced employment in July 2005.  This was at the 'tail end' of our previous negotiations for our Certified Agreement.  There was essentially no concessions awarded during that period of negotiation.

Despite this Air Traffic Controllers failed to take industrial action to improve their claim.  Why not?  

Cost.

Any effective air traffic control industrial action involves the withdrawal of labour (either stopping overtime or stopping work) or "working to rule" making the system less efficient, ie banning track shortening or with holding speed increases.  This obviously translates to increased costs.  Was this the primary consideration? No.

The previous federal government was in the final throws of laying down the "Workchoices" legislation in 2005.  There were rumours about 'invoking essential services provisions'; otherwise known as making it illegal for you to take industrial action.

Essentially the advice that union members received was a choice to either take this "bad deal" or be prepared to pay for a long and lengthy arbitration process, a pay freeze of 18+ months likely, then at the end of that arbitration process you may find the original "bad deal" looked better than the arbitrated outcome.

The levy being discussed at the time was approximately $1000 per head; to pay for legal cost for arbitration.  The joys of a small membership base.  This was on top of the approximate $1000 annual membership fee of the relevant union. 

Since that time we have 'restructured' the business.  This may or may not have been about sacking the 'dead wood' at the top; nearly every level two or executive manager has been moved on in the corresponding 3 years.

The new CEO has 'reformed' Air Traffic Control into 3 distinct streams.  Upper Airspace Services (UAS), Regional Services (RS) and East Coast Services (ECS).  UAS and RS exists at present in some sort of quasi separate business; but share staff consoles and resources.  Regional Towers have been combined into one 'supa group'.  ECS have had airspace restructure to carve off no 'ECS model' airspace to UAS and RS; particularly the low airspace has been moved to RS.

But at what cost?  Was it a good idea?